Issue: Government Function: Federal Agencies
The people of the United States, for many different and often opposing reasons, continue to find considerable fault with the operation of our federal government. In this Issue area, topics with suggestions about how to improve the operation of government agencies at the federal agency level are to be discussed.
The President of the United States has the opportunity to fill many positions in his or her administration. Under the United States Constitution and laws of the United States, certain of these position require confirmation (advice and consent) of the United States Senate (PAS - presidential appointment with Senate confirmation). There appears to be a recurring and ever increasing problem with the length of time that it takes for any current or new administration to permanently fill positions. This can be due to the administration itself, to challenges from the Senate Committee that holds confirmation hearings, or to challenges by the full Senate itself. The result of prolonged delay is that the citizens of the United States either have to be served by persons with temporary appointments who are not the best qualified for a position or are distracted by looking for permanent positions elsewhere. Any such temporary placement can result in that person not having the full confidence (or fully represent) the President. This situation can then result in an administration performing in a manner that does not represent the agenda of the person elected to be President. As a people we therefore cannot truly know if the Administration is performing in a manner that will or will not be of benefit to our country, and therefore if the person in that office (and his or her politically affiliated associates - i.e... Congressman of the same political persuasion) should be again elected to office. Ideas are requested that could lead to the reduction or end of delays in the Presidential appointment process.
There is ongoing discussion of the need for regulatory reform, but not sufficient discussion of how this would be accomplished. The cost of a new bureaucracy to undertake periodic examinations of regulations is prohibitive, and leaving ongoing regulatory reform in the hands of our political system is fraught with all types of problems. The following internal review system, within any and all organizations within governments at any level, is proposed:
Internal agency teams of nine (9) persons would be appointed by the working members of each organization, three (3) of whom could be appointed by the management of that organization. Each member would serve only one three (3) year term, with one-third of the members being replaced each year. The function of this team is to review one ninth to one third of the regulations of the organization, depending on the total number of regulations in place. In large organizations, with extensive regulations, these persons would be freed of their current job responsibilities, and be guaranteed their position back after their term of service.
The responsibility of the team members is to review the regulations assigned for review for that year, and to determine if a) each regulation is practical and serving the purpose for which it is in place, therefore recommending its renewal; b) not adequately performing its purpose as designed, and therefore recommending its revision to improve its function; c) inadequately performing its purpose as designed, and therefore recommending its elimination (with or without a recommendation for replacement); d) has become far too costly, and needs to be revised, reduced in size, or terminated; and e) it is working so well, that its application to other areas could be recommended.